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Abstract 
 Persons who have suffered loss or damage as a result of a 
prohibited practice in terms of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 
(the Act) have the right to recover such damage in the civil 
courts. This right is expressly provided for in section 65 of the 
Act. To date South Africa has failed to usher in an efficient and 
effective environment for section 65 civil damages actions, 
despite growing success being achieved by the competition 
authorities in uncovering and prosecuting firms for 
contraventions of the Act, including prohibited practices. 
Understanding how section 65 rights might be vindicated and 
whether South Africa's damages regime is adequate to deal with 
potentially complex damages actions within the realm of 
competition law contraventions, a starting point would be to gain 
certainty as to the classification of the nature of section 65 
damages. This article seeks to evaluate the arguments of 
whether these damages actions should be properly classified as 
statutory or delictual actions by the South African civil courts.  
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1 Introduction 
It is apparent from the wording of South Africa's Competition Act 89 of 1998 
(the Act) that the legislature envisaged the enforcement of both 
administrative penalties1 as well as civil damages2 against contravening 
firms or individuals. However, in order to properly assess the nature of these 
remedies, one needs to consider the underlying philosophical basis of the 
different remedies provided for in the Act. 
The courts have acknowledged the different objectives sought to be 
achieved by civil damages and administrative penalties. Civil damages are 
pursued to address private wrongs (corrective justice), whereas 
administrative penalties imposed by the Tribunal are made in the public 
interest (distributive justice).3 
2 Justice advanced by the Competition Act 89 of 1998 
Distributive justice accepts the difficulties and limitations of placing victims 
in the position they would have been in had the contravention not occurred 
and focusses on achieving greater wellbeing of the public at large.4 
The general wellbeing of the public lies in the investigation and prosecution 
of anti-competitive conduct in contravention of the Act and the enforcement 
of the statute in order to achieve the intended social welfare objectives. This 
engineers an active and fair competitive landscape from which the public 
(as consumers) can benefit. The imposition of administrative penalties 
against firms found to have contravened the Act is tantamount to promoting 
the objectives of distributive justice. Firms engaging in prohibited practices 
will be penalised, not for what damage was inflicted on any particular 
individual, but the administrative penalty will rather be imposed as a remedy 
to punish contravening conduct with a view to discouraging firms from acting 
in this manner in future. The greater objectives and interests of society at 
large are thereby protected.5 
                                            
* Malcom Ratz. BA LLB LLM (US) LLD (UP). Partner at Kruse Attorneys Incorporated, 
Pretoria, South Africa. Email: malcolm@rkattorneys.co.za. 
1  Section 59 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (the Competition Act). 
2  Section 65(6) of the Competition Act. 
3  American Natural Soda Corporation v Competition Commissioner 2003 5 SA 633 
(CAC) 639. Malan J states that: "the tribunal is not empowered to make orders for 
the payment of damages to any particular person (ss 62(5) and 65(5)): … Essentially, 
as I have said, they are orders of a limited kind to be made in the public interest. 
They do not seek to vindicate private rights." 
4  Vallentyne Date Unknown http://klinechair.missouri.edu/docs/distribu 
tive_justice_handbook.pdf. 
5  Mbazira Litigating Socio-economic Rights 114-115. Chayes 1976 Harv L Rev 1281, 
1294. Rawls Political Liberalism 16. See also Wellman "Justice" 70. 
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Corrective justice seeks to place victims of prohibited practices in the 
position they would have been in, but for the contravening conduct.6 The 
right to restitution for the victims of prohibited practices in terms of the Act 
is a right expressly recognised by the Act.7. The role of corrective justice is 
often a double-edged sword. Its primary objective is to compensate victims, 
while simultaneously adding deterrent value against prospective 
contravening conduct. 
The theory of distributive justice allows the enforced remedies to be 
prospective and centred on the needs of society. The competition 
authorities are, through the enforcement of penalties, enabled to deter 
future repetition of contravening conduct. In contrast, corrective justice is 
retrospective in nature, and focusses on addressing the harm suffered by 
the individual claimant.8 
A 2008 study performed by Connor and Lande considered many examples 
of cartel overcharges. The authors observed a median cartel overcharge of 
approximately 25%.9 A later study by Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh 
concluded that the median overcharge achieved by cartels was 
approximately 18%, and the average cartel overcharge was approximately 
20%.10 These studies indicate that cartels (save for unsuccessful cartels) 
gain significant additional profit by engaging in anti-competitive behaviour. 
This additional profit potentially renders an administrative penalty (capped 
at ten per cent of the turnover achieved in a single financial year)11 less of 
a financial threat, and/or deterrent than the legislature may have hoped. 
This poses the question: Does crime pay?12 
This is of particular significance if one considers that South Africa's 
competition law regime has to date failed to successfully usher in a culture 
of private competition damages actions. 
Penalties should be of such a magnitude that parties consider the threat of 
a penalty as sufficient deterrence. However, it is cautioned that excessive 
                                            
6  Modak-Truran 2000 Yale J L & Human 250. See also Gardner 2011 Law & Phil 1-
50. 
7  See s 65(6) of the Competition Act. 
8  Roach Constitutional Remedies 3-17. The perceived backward-looking nature of 
corrective justice is criticised in Gardner 2011 Law & Phil 14: "a second and perhaps 
more pernicious misinterpretation of the contrast between corrective and distributive 
justice would have it that norms of corrective justice are sensitive to the past (they 
set 'backward-looking' grounds of allocation) whereas norms of distributive justice 
look to the future (they set 'forward-looking' grounds of allocation)". 
9  Connor and Lande "Cartel Overcharges" 2208-2211. 
10  Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh Economics for Competition Lawyers 506. 
11  See s 59(2) of the Competition Act. 
12  Landes 1983 U Chi L Rev 652, 655: "despite the penalty, it still may be profitable to 
form the cartel. In our example, a $50 fine will be too low. Firms would not forgo 
cartel profits of $100 to avoid a $50 fine". 
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penalties could lead to inefficiencies within the competitive landscape that 
serve to prejudice society, instead of advancing the interests of society 
sought to be promoted by the imposition of the penalty.13 
In order to deter the inclination of parties to pursue their own interests, rather 
than conform to the laws of society, it is necessary to attach sanctions 
and/or penalties to the contravention - including contraventions of the Act. 
If they are contemplating contravening the Act, these firms must know that 
their conduct will have a negative impact on their own financial welfare 
through the incurring of administrative penalties and civil damages. This 
double-edged sword will discourage firms from engaging in such illegal 
conduct.14 
The interaction of both distributive and corrective justice shows how these 
two remedial objectives are both advanced by the Act. Distributive justice 
applies a remedy that will protect society from similar future contraventions 
(administrative penalties), and corrective justice is the compensatory 
remedy (private damages) of reparation for damage suffered by an 
individual as a result of the contravening conduct.  
In South Africa the public enforcement objective has steadily developed, but 
the private enforcement and recovery of private damages (ie corrective 
justice) has significantly lagged behind. This not only results in a less 
effective enforcement of competition law, but also means that individuals 
suffering due to prohibited practices are not vindicating their right to pursue 
civil damages against contravening firms. Assessing the nature of the 
individual's right to civil damages, as contemplated in section 65 of the Act, 
it is necessary not only for individuals to achieve the compensation they are 
entitled to, but also for the advancement of a more efficient multi-faceted 
competition law enforcement regime. 
3 Driving justice through private competition damages 
actions 
The primary objective of South African law when dealing with damages 
claims is: "to compensate the person who has suffered harm",15 by placing 
the victim in the position they would have been in had the wrongful conduct 
not been committed. Private enforcement consequently serves as an 
additional (potentially greater) deterrent to firms from engaging in anti-
competitive practices. It is in the best interests of the public and the 
                                            
13  Landes 1983 U Chi L Rev 652, 655 Also see Lianos 2011 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/drupal/cles/sites/cles/files/cles_3_2011new.pdf 3. 
14  Wells and Eaton Constitutional Remedies 176. 
15  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 216. 
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competition authorities to create an environment in which private damages 
claims for contraventions of the Act are encouraged and facilitated. 
The South African Competition Act applies to all economic activity within or 
having an effect within South Africa.16 Section 65(6) of the Act states: 
A person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of a prohibited practice– 
(a) may not commence an action in a civil court for the assessment of the 
amount or awarding of damages if that person has been awarded 
damages in a consent order confirmed in terms of section 49D(1); or  
(b) if entitled to commence an action referred to in paragraph (a), when 
instituting proceedings, must file with the Registrar or Clerk of the 
Court a notice from the Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal, or 
the Judge President of the Competition Appeal Court, in the 
prescribed form – 
(i) certifying that the conduct constituting the basis for the action has 
been found to be a prohibited practice in terms of this Act;  
(ii) stating the date of the Tribunal or Competition Appeal Court finding; 
and  
(iii) setting out the section of this Act in terms of which the Tribunal or 
the Competition Appeal Court made its finding. 
The Act contemplates that a person who has suffered loss or damage as a 
result of a prohibited practice shall commence a potential damages action 
in a civil court.17 
This creates a two-phased adjudication process for civil damages actions 
arising from contraventions of the Act. The Competition Tribunal and the 
Competition Appeal Court adjudicate the conduct, and the civil courts are 
called upon to assess the damages (if any) arising from the conduct.18 Civil 
damages actions brought subsequent to the findings of the Competition 
Tribunal or Competition Appeal Court are commonly referred to as follow-
on damages.19 
                                            
16  Section 3(1) of the Competition Act. See also s 62(1). 
17  Section 65(6)(b) of the Competition Act. Emphasis added. 
18  The only exception to this two-phased adjudication jurisdiction appears to be the 
authority granted to the Competition Tribunal in terms of s 49D of the Competition 
Act to confirm consent orders that contain a damages award in favour of the victim(s) 
of the conduct. Van Heerden and Neethling Unlawful Competition 58: "the 
Competition Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court have no jurisdiction over the 
assessment of the amount, and awarding, of damages arising from prohibited 
practice". See also American Natural Soda Corporation v Competition Commission 
2003 5 SA 633 (CAC) 639-640. 
19  Brassey et al Competition Law 327. Sutherland and Kemp Competition Law 12-7. 
Niels, Jenkins and Kavanagh Economics for Competition Lawyers 493: "after a 
competition authority has found an infringement and imposed a remedy (often a 
fine), parties that have been harmed by the infringement may file a claim for 
M RATZ  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  6 
The primary objective of follow-on damages is to compensate the victims of 
anti-competitive behaviour, but such actions serve as an additional 
deterrent, assisting public enforcement efforts and promoting compliance 
with the Act. Despite the clear gains to be had from private damages 
actions, it is surprising that approximately only 25% of the findings of a 
contravention by the European Commission have resulted in the victims' 
pursuing civil damages actions.20 
Despite the Act’s being in operation for more than 15 years, the first private 
damages action arising from a contravention of the Act in South Africa was 
made on 8 August 2016.21 The slow development of private competition 
damages actions in South Africa can be ascribed to various reasons, 
primarily the complexities of quantifying damages arising from anti-
competitive conduct and the high cost of litigation in South Africa. 
Furthermore, most consumers lack the financial resources to bring a 
complex civil damages action against large corporate firms. 
South African law relating to follow-on damages from contraventions of the 
Act is underdeveloped. Recent events provide some insight as to how 
follow-on damages actions may be facilitated in South Africa. These include 
the recent Supreme Court of Appeal ruling on class actions, which may 
significantly advance access for individuals to prosecute private competition 
damages claims, as well the views expressed on the nature of the damages 
action arising from contraventions of the Act.22 
3.1 Section 65 follow-on damages and the South African legal 
framework 
The Competition Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court have exclusive 
jurisdiction to adjudicate whether conduct is in contravention of the 
provisions of the Act.  
Section 65(6)(b) of the Act states that a party pursuing an action for civil 
damages requires a certificate from the Chairman of the Competition 
Tribunal or the President of the Competition Appeal Court, certifying that the 
conduct forming the basis of the damages claim has been found to be a 
                                            
damages against the infringer … such 'follow-on' damages claims under competition 
law are increasingly common in many jurisdictions". 
20  European Commission 2013 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-
525_en.htm. In South Africa, the number of private damages actions arising from a 
finding of a contravention of the Competition Act are negligible.  
21  Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2016 
6 SA 19 (GJ). 
22  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA); Nationwide 
Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2016 6 SA 19 
(GJ). 
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prohibited practice in terms of the Act.23 The section 65 certificate is 
irrefutable confirmation of the contravention of the Act by the cited party. 
The civil courts are bound by this finding.24 The civil court will be required to 
assess the remaining elements of causation and the extent of the damages 
caused by the contravening conduct.25 
Section 65 of the Act requires that when follow-on damages are claimed, a 
two-phased approach has to be adopted. First, the Competition Tribunal 
and/or Competition Appeal Court must determine whether the Act has been 
contravened, and second, the civil courts are tasked with assessing the 
damages and whether the contravention caused the loss claimed.26 The 
question that this raises is whether follow-on damages sanctioned by 
section 65 of the Act are to be viewed as common law delictual claims or 
statutory damages claims.27 
In Children's Resources Centre v Pioneer Foods28 the parties offered 
differing interpretations of section 65.29 Clarifying the nature of section 65 
damages claims is fundamental for the purposes of understanding who may 
institute such a claim, as well as the scope of the onus to be discharged by 
a claimant. 
                                            
23  This means that a plaintiff in such a damages claim is essentially relieved not only 
of showing conduct, but also of showing unlawfulness in a damages claim resulting 
from an infringement of the Competition Act. These elements would have been 
predetermined by the relevant Competition Tribunal and are then evidenced by the 
s 65(6)(b) certificate.  
24  Section 65(2) of the Competition Act states the following: "If, in any action in a civil 
court, a party raises an issue concerning conduct that is prohibited in terms of this 
Act, that court must not consider that issue on its merits, and – if the issue raised is 
one in respect of which the Competition Tribunal or Competition Appeal Court has 
made an order, the court must apply the determination of the Tribunal or the 
Competition Appeal Court to the issue…". 
25  Scallan, Mbikiwa and Blignaut 2013 http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Conference-Paper-Final-21-08-2013.pdf. 
26  For the purposes of s 65 damages actions, the contravention verdict by the 
Competition Tribunal would mean that certain of the requirements for common law 
civil liability, notably conduct, unlawfulness and fault, have already been established 
and need not, and in fact cannot, be reconsidered by the civil courts. 
27  The debate as to the categorisation of competition damages actions is not unique to 
South Africa. The English courts are also faced with the issue of the type of damages 
claim that arises from statutory contraventions. See WH Newson Holding Ltd v IMI 
Plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1377, where the court found that s 47A damages are not 
limited to claims of breach of a statutory duty. Also see WH Newson Holding Ltd v 
IMI Plc [2012] EWHC 3680 (Ch) 29, where Roth J with reference to the scope of s 
47A damages states that such a claim is not restricted to one arising from a statutory 
duty, but rather, that one is to consider "the factual nature of the claim, not the cause 
of action with which it is clothed". 
28  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA). 
29  The appellants (Children's Resource Centre) argued an interpretation in favour of s 
65's creating a delictual claim upon which the subsequent damages action is to be 
based. The respondent (Pioneer) argued that the claim referred to in s 65 was based 
solely on statute.  
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3.2 Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food and follow-on 
damages 
3.2.1 Follow-on damages claim 
During November 2010 representatives acting on behalf of consumers30 
and distributors31 brought an application for the certification of a class action 
for damages suffered by the respective groups arising from the increase in 
bread prices manipulated by the cartel. The Western Cape High Court 
dismissed both the applications for the certification of a class and the parties 
applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.32  
The consumers' application for the certification of a class (Children's 
Resource Centre)33 was favourably received by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. This acceptance augurs well for significant developments in the 
South African law of class actions and subsequent follow-on damages 
claims. Establishing requirements for the certification of a class for the 
purposes of instituting a class action is a step in the right direction. 
Consequently, the consumers' appeal was upheld and the Supreme Court 
of Appeal ordered that the matter be referred back to the Western Cape 
High Court for the filing of further affidavits.34 
The development of class actions in the South African context is a major 
advance, as this will undoubtedly support the ability of consumers to gain 
access to the courts, thereby facilitating the vindication of individual rights 
to recover damages from contravening parties. 
A fundamental issue to be considered is the basis of the damages 
assessment to be undertaken and proven. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
was not tasked with assessing the nature of the damages claim, but Wallis 
                                            
30  Children's Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd; Mukaddam v Pioneer 
Foods (Pty) Ltd 2011 ZAWCHC 102 (7 April 2011). 
31  Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 5 SA 89 (CC). 
32  Children's Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd; Mukaddam v Pioneer 
Foods (Pty) Ltd 2011 ZAWCHC 102 (7 April 2011). Also see Children's Resource 
Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA); Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 
2013 2 SA 254 (SCA). 
33  Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 5 SA 89 (CC). 
34  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA). Importantly, the 
consumers' certification application was sought in terms of both the complaints; first, 
in respect of the Western Cape complaint and second, with regard to the national 
complaint against the bread producers. The SCA upheld the consumer's application 
only insofar as it related to the Western Cape complaint and dismissed the appeal 
relating to certification of the class for the national complaint.  
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JA35 dealt to a limited degree with this question, before remitting the matter 
back to the High Court.36  
4 Children's Resource Centre ruling: section 65 - delictual 
or statutory? 
Wallis JA37 was faced with two conflicting interpretations of section 65 of the 
Act. The consumers argued that a claim for damages in the current context 
should be assessed as a delictual action flowing from a breach of statutory 
duty. Premier (the third respondent) interpreted section 65 of the Act as 
creating a statutory claim to the exclusion of a delictual or other common-
law remedy.38 
Wallis JA recognised the importance of this debate. He noted that if Premier 
was correct in its assertion that the Act provides for an exclusive follow-on 
statutory claim, then there was no recognised legal duty attaching to the 
breach, and the consumer's argument that damages were claimed by 
delictual action could not succeed. However, Wallis JA conceded that if 
Premier's submission was incorrect, then the argument by the consumers 
was strengthened. Section 65(6) of the Act recognises the right to claim 
damages for harm suffered as a result of contraventions (i.e. prohibited 
practices) of the Act. The absence of a specific statutory claim would mean 
that there must be a delictual remedy available to the injured parties.39 
4.1 Section 65: delictual action for damages 
In South Africa common-law actions for damages are brought either in terms 
of the actio legis Aquiliae or in terms of the actio injuriarum. Where loss due 
                                            
35  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA). 
36  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 247. Wallis JA 
states: "… in summary the claim that the appellants seek to advance has a 
potentially plausible basis, but it is premature at the stage of this appeal for this court 
to determine questions raised by these arguments in view of their novelty, complexity 
and the fact that they are raised for the first time in this court. The appellants should 
not be non-suited on these grounds, which would be the effect of dismissing their 
appeal, but equally the respondents' arguments cannot be rejected at this stage. 
That indicates that it is desirable to refer the present application back to the high 
court, with appropriate directions for the delivery of further affidavits …" 
37  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 242-244. 
38  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 242-244. 
39  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 244: "… the legal 
arguments about the existence of a legal duty and the existence of an exclusive 
statutory claim in terms of s 65 of the Act are linked. If Premier is correct that the Act 
provides an exclusive follow-on claim then the legal duty on which the appellants 
rely does not exist. However, if it is incorrect, that strengthens the appellants' hand 
considerably, because S 65(6) recognises the possibility of claims arising from 
prohibited anti-competitive conduct, so that the absence of a specific statutory claim 
would suggest that there must be a delictual claim available to at least some persons 
injured by such conduct". 
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to the unlawful and culpable damage to a patrimonial interest occurs, 
damages are claimed using the actio legis Aquilae.40 If a non-patrimonial 
interest (e.g. the physical or mental integrity of a person) is compromised 
by unlawful and intentional conduct, non-patrimonial damages (injury to 
personality rights) using the actio iniuriarum are claimed.41 
It is impossible to postulate a contravention of the Act that could infringe 
rights of personality, as the provisions of the Act, particularly those 
constituting prohibited practices triggering section 65 private damages 
actions, do not contemplate or recognise such infringements as 
contraventions of the Act. Where a damages claim is instituted for a 
prohibited practice, the nature of the damage will consequently be 
patrimonial. and such damage must be claimed using the actio legis 
Aquiliae.42 
In South Africa the actio legis Aquiliae has developed into a far more 
encompassing action than its rigid Roman law genesis, and subsequent 
Roman-Dutch law evolution.43 South African courts have progressively 
developed the scope of the actio legis Aquliae from the Roman-Dutch 
position. De Villiers states in The Cape Good Hope Bank that: "the action in 
factum was no longer confined to cases of damage done to corporeal 
                                            
40  Potgieter, Steynberg and Floyd Visser and Potgieter Law of Damages 6. In 
Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 
377 Booysen states: "… in essence the Aquilian action lies for patrimonial loss 
caused by wrongfully (or unlawfully) and culpably". Also see Perlman v Zoutendyk 
1934 CPD 151 155; Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction 
(Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA 901 (N); Franschoekse Wynkelder (Ko-op) Bpk v SAR & H 1981 
3 SA 36 (E) 430; Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers SA (Pty) 
Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A). 
41  Van Heerden and Neethling Unlawful Competition 68. The distinction between a 
claim for patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss is discussed in Matthews v Young 
1922 AD 492. Also see Bredell v Pienaar 1924 CPD 203 213; Universitiet van 
Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T) 385; Moaki v Reckitt 
and Colman (Africa) Ltd 1988 4 SA 63 (D) 65; Brenner v Botha 1956 3 SA 257 (T) 
260. 
42  Geary & Son (Pty) Ltd v Gove 1964 1 SA 434 (A) 441A. Justice Steyn states that "I 
do not propose to attempt a definition of the limits set to competition in trade by 
Aquilian liability, but whatever those limitations are, it seems clear that interference 
of the nature indicated is recognised as an infringement of a trader's rights and 
therefore a delict in our law". Also see William Grant and Sons Ltd v Cape Wine 
Distillers Ltd 1990 3 SA 897 (C) 915, where Justice Berman stated: "… in South 
Africa unlawful competition is recognised as an actionable wrong … fitting 
comfortably under the umbrella provided by the lex Aquilia". 
43  Traditionally, Roman law restricted the action to corporeal damage (ie damage to 
property or assets). See Van den Heever Aquilian Damages 8-14. The application 
of the action was later extended by Roman-Dutch law. It appears that there was a 
move away from the requirement of physical impairment of property. See Cape of 
Good Hope Bank v Fischer (1886) 4 SC 368. Further, the Acquilian action could be 
used to claim damages for injury to personality. See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 
Neethling's Law of Personality 48. See Van Heerden and Neethling Unlawful 
Competition 70-71. Also see Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 8-16. 
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property, but was extended to every kind of loss sustained by a person as 
a consequence of the wrongful acts of another".44 The current South Africa 
Aquilian action is a modern adaptation and application of the classical 
Aquilian action. Aquilian liability may now result from every culpable and 
wrongful act that results in patrimonial loss being suffered.45 
Within the context of damages arising from unlawful competition, the courts 
have long accepted that such loss should be recovered by way of the action 
legis Aquiliae.46 
While the South African Aquilian action may allow for a far more liberal 
application than that originally envisaged by the Romans, its application is 
somewhat tempered in the context of damages arising from the 
contravention of a statute (presently the Competition Act). Damage in this 
instance will be limited to the type of damage contemplated by the 
legislature when enacting the statute for the benefit of a particular person or 
group of persons. 
                                            
44  Cape of Good Hope Bank v Fischer (1886) 4 SC 368 376. Also see Matthews v 
Young 1922 AD 492 504; Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskapy van 
SA Bpk 1973 1 SA 769 (A) 776-777. 
45  Perlman v Zoutendyk 1934 CPD 151 155, where Watermeyer states that: "Roman-
Dutch Law approaches a new problem in the continental rather than English way, 
because in general all damage caused unjustifiably (injuria) is actionable, whether 
caused intentionally (dolo) or by negligence (culpa)". 
46  Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492 507: "… all a person can, therefore, claim is the 
right to exercise his calling without unlawful interference from others. Such 
interference would constitute an injuria for which an action under the lex Aquilia lies 
if it has directly resulted in loss". Also see Geary & Son (Pty) Ltd v Gove 1964 1 SA 
434 (A) 440-441, where Steyn recognises that the Aquilian action is available to 
persons suffering loss as a result of unlawful competition and who elects to sue in 
delict. Also see inter alia Geary & Son (Pty) Ltd v Gove 1964 1 SA 434 (A); Atlas 
Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 2 SA 173 (T); 
Lorimar Productions Incorporated v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Limited; 
Lorimar Productions Incorporated v OK Hyperama Limited; Lorimar Productions 
Incorporated v Dallas Restaurant 1981 3 SA 1129 (T); Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd 
v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 1 SA 209 (C); Link 
Estates (Pty) Ltd v Rink Estates (Pty) Ltd 1979 2 SA 697 (E); Victor Products (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd v Lataleure Manufacturing 1975 1 SA 961 (W); Stellenbosch Wine Trust v 
Oude Meester Group 1972 3 SA 152 (C); Stellenbosch Wine Trust v Oude Meester 
Group 1977 2 SA 221 (C); Prok Africa (Pty) Ltd v NTH (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 687 (W); 
Silver Crystal Trading v Namibia Diamond Corporation 1983 4 SA 884 (D); Sea 
Harvest Corporation v Irvin & Johnson 1985 2 SA 355 (E); Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 
667 (A); Moroka Swallows Football Club v The Birds Football Club 1988 2 SA 350 
(W); Sibex Construction v Injectaseal 1988 2 SA 54 (T); Elida Gibbs v Colgate 
Palmolive 1988 2 SA 350 (W); Pepsico Inc v United Tobacco Co Ltd 1988 2 SA 334 
(W); William Grant and Sons Ltd v Cape Wine Distillers Ltd 1990 3 SA 897 (C); Long 
John International v Stellenbosch Wine Trust 1990 4 SA 136 (D); Tie Rack plc v Tie 
Rack Stores 1989 4 SA 427 (T); Sage Holdings v Financial Mail 1991 2 SA 117 (W); 
Times Media v SABC 1990 4 SA 604 (W). 
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4.2 Arguments favouring section 65 damages as delictual action 
The essence of the argument by the consumers in Children's Resource 
Centre47 is that once the Competition Tribunal or the Competition Appeal 
Court has made a finding that the defendant contravened the Act, then a 
party suffering loss or damage as a result of the contravention must allege 
and prove all the elements of a delict in order to successfully pursue its civil 
damages. The consumers (appellants in the Supreme Court of Appeal) 
argued that the Act prohibits anti-competitive conduct in the interest of 
promoting competition and benefitting the interests of consumers.48 The 
prohibitions contained in the Act are essential to achieving the objectives of 
the Act and create a fair environment within which consumers are not 
exploited, and receive a variety of quality products at competitive prices.49 
South African case law lends support to the proposition that the existence 
of a statutory duty not to act in a certain way results in a legal duty not to 
cause financial loss.50 This was echoed by the appellants (the consumers) 
in Children's Resource Centre in the context of the Competition Act. The 
bread producers had a legal duty not to cause financial loss and their 
contravention of the provisions of the Act was in breach of this legal duty. 
Ultimately, the breach by the bread producers resulted in the consumers 
paying higher prices for bread and consequently suffering financial harm.51 
Essentially: "the appellants have now nailed their colours to the mast of a 
delictual action flowing from a breach of a statutory duty".52 
4.3 Arguments favouring section 65 being a statutory claim 
Pioneer (First Respondent)53 advanced the argument that section 38(c) of 
the Constitution54 recognises proceedings for appropriate relief on the 
grounds of an infringement of any right in the Bill of Rights by "anyone acting 
as a member, or in the interests of, a group or class of persons". Although 
the instituting of class actions is recognised insofar as the enforcement of a 
constitutional claim and claims relating to the Bill of Rights is concerned, the 
                                            
47  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA). 
48  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 243. 
49  See s 2(b) of the Competition Act. 
50  Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 3 SA 151 (SCA); Olitzki 
Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 SA 1247 (SCA). The ruling 
given in Lascon Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wadeville Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1998 4 SA 
578 (W) erroneously suggested that the breach of a statutory duty automatically 
implies that a delict has been committed. This is incorrect, as in order for a claimant 
to successfully institute a delictual claim all the elements of a delict must be proven 
(ie conduct, damage and causation). See Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, 
Eastern Cape 2007 3 SA 121 (CC) 139. 
51  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 243. 
52  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 242. 
53  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 242. 
54  Section 38(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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recognition of class actions in the Constitution does not confer standing in 
relation to a delictual claim.55 This argument was dismissed by Wallis JA.56 
Premier (Third Respondent) argued that the appellants' delictual action be 
dismissed because the Competition Act was not enacted for the benefit of 
the parties who had sought to institute the damages claim, and therefore 
the necessary legal duty giving rise to delictual liability had never been 
established.57 It was further argued that the fundamental elements of the 
delictual action, of damages and the necessary causal connection between 
the alleged conduct and damage suffered, had not been proven by the 
appellants. 
Premier adopted the view that section 65 of the Act provides for follow-on 
damages, based on the finding by the Competition Tribunal that the firm had 
engaged in anti-competitive conduct in contravention of the Act. A proper 
construction of the Act, insofar as Premier was concerned, is that the 
damages claim is exclusive to section 65, thereby prohibiting a common-
law delictual action.58 
Firstly, Premier argued that the Act created a specialist regime for dealing 
with competition law issues (including whether a party has engaged in 
prohibited practices) and if a contravention occurs, how it should be 
penalised.59 The bifurcation of jurisdiction created by the Act meant that 
ordinary civil courts are afforded an extremely limited role in relation to the 
cause of action arising from the Act. This was restricted to the assessment 
of or the awarding of damages. Accordingly, the ordinary civil courts had no 
                                            
55  Heads of Argument filed by the First Respondent, Children's Resource Centre v 
Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) para 4. Essentially Premier argued that in order 
for a delictual remedy for a breach of a statute to be relied upon, the necessary 
evidentiary requirements had to be met, including showing that the applicable statute 
allowed the particular party to bring such a claim.  
56  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) para 21: Wallis 
JA stated: "… in my judgment it would be irrational for the court to sanction a class 
action in cases where a constitutional right is invoked, but to deny it in equally 
appropriate circumstances, merely because of the claimants' inability to point to the 
infringement of a right protected under the Bill of Rights. The procedural 
requirements that will be determined in relation to the one type of case can equally 
easily be applied in the other. Class actions are a particularly appropriate way in 
which to vindicate some types of constitutional rights, but they are equally useful in 
the context of mass personal injury cases or consumer litigation". 
57  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 243. 
58  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 243. See 
Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 3 SA 151 (SCA) para 22: 
"… one has to concede that our case law is not clear when it comes to drawing the 
boundary between liability due to the breach of a statutory duty and that of a 
common-law one. It appears to me that if the breach of a statutory duty, on a 
conspectus of the statute, can give rise to a damages claim, a common-law legal 
duty cannot arise". 
59  Competition Commission of South Africa v Telkom SA Ltd 2010 All SA 433 (SCA) 
paras 27, 36.  
M RATZ  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  14 
power to freely determine whether a delict had been proved and what the 
appropriate damages in the given situation should be. 
Secondly, Premier contended that a proper interpretation of the Act 
restricted the circumstances in which civil damages would be available. This 
would be only after the Competition Tribunal or Competition Appeal Court 
had made a final ruling on the matter, and only if the injured party had not 
been awarded damages in terms of a consent order.60 This, Premier 
submitted, was an extraordinary limitation, not generally associated with 
normal delictual claims. This lent support to the position that section 65 
damages actions must be managed within the auspices of the Act, and not 
as normal delictual actions. 
Finally, Premier argued that the Act provided for strict liability.61 Claimants 
pursuing damages actions were absolved from having to prove fault (either 
negligence or intent) on the part of the contravening firm. A claimant could 
not simultaneously benefit from a regime of strict liability imposed by the 
statute, while endeavouring to avoid the other statutory requirements and 
limitations imposed on civil damages claims by the self-same statute, i.e. 
the Competition Act, in order to advance its common-law claim. To this 
extent, one of the limitations imposed was that the Act allowed a person 
who had suffered loss or damage to pursue a damages action before the 
civil court. The present matter envisaged an action by a class for damages 
arising from the contravention of the Act. Premier argued that a damages 
action brought by a class fell outside the scope of the statutory action 
envisaged by the Act and accordingly should not be entertained by the 
courts.62  
If regard is had for the remedial philosophy of the respective remedies 
(administrative penalties and the civil damages actions) then Premier's 
argument to exclude class actions seems to carry some weight. The 
damages claim by a class action fails to serve the remedial purpose 
                                            
60  Section 65(6)(a) of the Competition Act. 
61  Heads of Argument filed by the Third Respondent, Children's Resource Centre v 
Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) para 22.4. 
62  This proposition was dismissed by Wallis JA in Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer 
Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) para 21. Wallis JA stated: "… in my judgment it would 
be irrational for the court to sanction a class action in cases where a constitutional 
right is invoked, but to deny it in equally appropriate circumstances, merely because 
of the claimants' inability to point to the infringement of a right protected under the 
Bill of Rights. The procedural requirements that will be determined in relation to the 
one type of case can equally easily be applied in the other. Class actions are a 
particularly appropriate way in which to vindicate some types of constitutional rights, 
but they are equally useful in the context of mass personal injury cases or consumer 
litigation". 
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advanced by corrective justice. It does not rectify the wrong to the private 
individual.63  
Premier's arguments that the Act envisages a rigid statutory damages 
regime and as such a party (and the courts) will be obliged to follow the 
action as directed by the applicable statute may be credible if, by way of 
analogy, regard is had to the position expressed by the Constitutional Court 
in the matter of Phillips v National Director of Public Prosecutions.64 The 
court was required to decide whether the High Court was permitted to 
rescind an order on grounds other than those specified in the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. The Constitutional Court took a very 
narrow view, stating that: "I do not think that an Act of Parliament can simply 
be ignored and reliance placed directly on a provision in the Constitution, 
nor is it permissible to side-step an Act of Parliament by resorting to the 
common-law".65 
Should Premier's interpretation be attributed to section 65 of the Act, then 
parties and the courts will be bound by the provisions of the Act, including 
the statutory limitations sought to be imposed on these damages actions by 
the wording or the empowering statute. 
4.4 Assessment of section 65 
The Supreme Court of Appeal did not make a finding as to whether section 
65 damages should be considered a delictual action or statutory, remitting 
the matter back to the High Court for the filing of further affidavits in 
amplification of the arguments.66 
The fundamental difference between a delictual action and statutory action 
hinges on the elements that need to be proven for a claimant to succeed 
with the claim. In a statutory damages action, based on strict liability (the 
                                            
63  Heads of Argument filed by the Appellants, Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer 
Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) para 6.2: "… the payment of damages to each individual 
member of the classes would not be feasible. Even were it possible to determine 
how much of the respondents' bread each individual consumer bought during the 
relevant periods, the damage suffered by each individual are relatively small and the 
cost of distributing these sum prohibitive. Accordingly, the damages will not be 
distributed to individual members of the classes …" 
64  Phillips v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 1 SA 505 (CC). 
65  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) paras 50-51. 
66  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) para 75, (247): 
"… in summary the claim that the appellants seek to advance has a potentially 
plausible basis, but it is premature at the stage of this appeal for this court to 
determine questions raised by these arguments in view of their novelty, complexity 
and the fact that they are raised for the first time in this court. The appellants should 
not be non-suited on these grounds, which would be the effect of dismissing their 
appeal, but equally the respondents' arguments cannot be rejected at this stage. 
That indicates that it is desirable to refer the present application back to the high 
court, with appropriate directions for the delivery of further affidavits…" 
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claimant need not allege and prove fault), a breach of a statute is prima 
facia wrongful and fault is not a requirement.67 Should a strict statutory 
regime be followed for the recovery of private competition damages in terms 
of section 65 of the Act, then these actions are equally restricted by the 
provisions of the Act, including possibly limiting such claims to individuals, 
to the exclusion of classes. 
A delictual action requires the claimant to prove the elements of 
wrongfulness and fault to succeed with the claim, together with all the other 
elements of a delictual action.  
Ultimately, the question is whether a proper reading of section 65 in the 
context of the Act allows for the interpretation of a statutory damages action 
to the exclusion of a common law delictual damages action. 
The wording of section 65(6) of the Act, which reads: "a person who has 
suffered loss or damage as a result of a prohibited practice…", clearly 
envisages that any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of 
a contravention of Chapter 2 of the Competition Act may claim such loss.68 
Despite recognising the potential of a damages claim’s being brought, 
section 65 does not provide any detail or requirements for such an action. 
Rather, section 65 appears to merely regulate the practical jurisdictional 
aspects pertaining to the adjudication of potential contraventions of the Act 
on the one hand, and on the other the adjudication and assessment of a 
follow-on damages action arising from a contravention of the Act.  
Section 65(2) confirms that the Competition Tribunal and Competition 
Appeal Court adjudicate the conduct and sections 65(6) and 65(7) confirm 
that the civil courts assess and award civil damages. Thus, the two-phased 
approach to follow-on damages in the context of contraventions of Chapter 
2 of the Act is established. Premier argued that it is the very fact that a two-
phased procedure has been created which supports the notion of strict 
                                            
67  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 78; Van Heerden and Neethling 
Unlawful Competition 253. While the distinction between statutory claims and 
delictual claims can be seen in the elements required to be alleged and proven in 
each case, this is not the only difference between these actions, as statutory actions 
also provide a more comprehensive description of the extent of the damage which 
can be claimed, thereby creating a damages system separate from the normal 
common-law delictual damages actions and assessment of damages. The 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 is an example 
of a statute creating a statutory damages regime. S 47(1)(a) of the Act reads as 
follows: "Compensation for temporary total disablement shall be calculated on the 
basis set out in item 1 of Schedule 4 subject to the minimum and maximum 
amounts." Schedule 4 then specifies the manner in which damages will be calculated 
in various instances. 
68  Section 65(6) of the Competition Act. 
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statutory liability.69 The Act creates a specialist tribunal with exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine whether or not a prohibited practice has been 
committed, and the civil courts' involvement is limited to the assessment 
and determination of follow-on damages.70 
In assessing the respective arguments regarding the nature of the follow-on 
damages action, Wallis JA acknowledged that certain aspects of section 65 
lend support to the interpretation advanced by Premier, highlighting sections 
65(6)(a) and 49D(4) as examples. Section 65(6)(a) refers to a person who 
has suffered loss or damage as a result of a prohibited practice commencing 
an action in the civil court for the assessment of the amount or awarding of 
damages. Wallis JA referred to the wording of section 65(6)(a) of the Act 
that could indicate that the action pursued before the civil court concerns 
only the quantification of the damage suffered and nothing more.71 
Furthermore, Wallis JA referred to section 49D(4) of the Act, which deals 
with a complainant’s applying for an award of civil damages. He 
acknowledged that this section appears to support the notion advanced by 
Premier that the damages award is a rigid mechanical process, in which the 
civil court is tasked only with the assessment of the damage, and not 
required to consider any element other than quantification.72 
It must be noted that section 49D(4) reads:  
A consent order does not preclude a complainant from applying for –  
(a) a declaration in terms of section 58(1)(a) (v) or (vi); or  
(b) an award of civil damages in terms of section 65, unless the consent 
order includes an award for damages to the complainant. 
If regard is had to the wording of section 49D(4), then it is entirely unclear 
how Wallis JA considered section 49D(4) as lending support to the 
                                            
69  Sutherland and Kemp Competition Law 12-8: "… if a party seeks damages in respect 
of a prohibited practice it must seek a declaration from the Tribunal that the conduct 
of the respondent is a prohibited practice in terms of the Act, for the purpose of 
section 65. A person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of the prohibited 
practice may rely on such a declaration to bring an action in the Magistrate's Court 
or the High Court to recover damages in this respect". Also see the following cases, 
which lend strong support that the provisions of s 65 create a two-tiered adjudication 
process for the assessment and awarding of damages, with a regulated procedural 
interaction between the various competition authorities and the civil courts, each 
responsible for a specific limited part of the adjudication process: Premier Foods 
(Pty) Ltd v Manoim 2016 1 SA 445 (SCA); Seagram Africa (Pty) Ltd v Stellenbosch 
Farmers' Winery 2001 2 SA 1129 (C) 1142; SAD Holdings v South African Raisins 
2000 3 SA 766 (T); South African Raisins (Pty) Ltd v SAD Holdings Ltd 2001 2 SA 
877 (SCA); American Natural Soda Corporation v Competition Commissioner 2003 
5 SA 633 (CAC) 639. 
70  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 245. 
71  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 246. 
72  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) 246. 
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argument that the damages claim is one found in statute. Other than to 
suggest that the parties should not include an amount for damages in a 
consent order, section 49D(4) does not provide a mechanism for 
establishing or dealing with damages. It is only when a settlement inclusive 
of damages is reached that it is ordered that a claim for damages as 
provided for in section 65 is excluded. Section 65(6) states that such a 
damages action will commence in the civil courts for the assessment and 
awarding of damages. Contrary to what Wallis JA states, a conjunctive 
reading of section 65 and section 49D(4) does not support the conclusion 
that the Act has created a statutory damages claim, but rather confirms that 
the civil courts are responsible for the assessment and awarding of 
damages. 
4.5 Interpretation of section 65 as a cause of action 
The Supreme Court of Appeal was reluctant to take a firm position regarding 
the question of whether section 65 of the Act creates a statutory or a 
delictual damages claim for the victims of prohibited conduct in terms of the 
Act. While the Supreme Court of Appeal steered away from making any 
conclusive remarks on the subject, an evaluation and interpretation of the 
relevant statutory provisions is nonetheless required. 
When interpreting a statutory provision, regard must be had for the intention 
of the legislature. In order to do this, the words of the statute under 
consideration must be given their normal grammatical meaning, unless this 
would lead to an entirely untenable meaning being attributed thereto.73 In 
cases where the words conceivably are not restricted to a single 
grammatical meaning or interpretation, then regard has to be had for the 
context within which these words are used within the statute being 
interpreted, and the purpose being promoted by the particular statute.74 
                                            
73  Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 1 SA 925 
(A) 942-944. Smalberger J states: "… the primary rule in the construction of statutory 
provisions is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature. It is now well-established 
that one seeks to achieve this, in the first instance, by giving the words of the 
enactment under consideration their ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do so 
would lead to an absurdity so glaring the Legislature count not have contemplated 
it". Also see Standard Bank Investment Corporation Ltd v Competition Commission; 
Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd v Competition Commission 2000 2 SA 797 
(SCA), Schultz J states: "… our Courts have, over many years, striven to give effect 
to the policy or object or purpose of legislation. This is reflected in a passage from 
the judgment of Innes CJ in Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 
1920 AD 530, 543. But the passage also reflects that it is not the function of a court 
to do violence to the language of a statute and impose its view of what the policy or 
object of a measure should be". 
74  Bastian Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman Primary School 
2008 5 SA 1 (SCA); University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council 1986 4 SA 903 (A) 
941; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 89; Thoroughbred Breeders' Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 4 SA 
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Applying the primary rule of interpretation of statutory provisions and giving 
the words used in section 65 their normal grammatical meaning, it appears 
that the legislature intended to remove the assessment and awarding of 
damages from the powers conferred upon the Competition Tribunal and 
Competition Appeal Court, by expressly stating in section 65 of the Act that 
damages actions are to be commenced in the civil court for the assessment 
and awarding thereof (provided damages have not been settled in a section 
49D consent order).75 
The legislature's intention to remove the assessment of damages from the 
jurisdiction of the Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court is 
confirmed by the wording of section 62(5) of the Act, which reads:76  
62(5) For greater certainty, the Competition Tribunal and Competition 
Appeal Court have no jurisdiction over the assessment of the amount, 
and awarding, of damages arising out of a prohibited practice.  
It is important to note that not all contraventions of the Act are classified as 
prohibited practices. Section 65(6) of the Act deals expressly with a 
damages action by a person who has suffered loss or damage as a result 
of a prohibited practice.77 The Act may, however, be contravened in 
manners other than those contemplated in Chapter 2. For example, Chapter 
3 of the Act deals with mergers and the notification of mergers to the 
competition authorities.78 It is a contravention of the Act to implement a 
                                            
551 (SCA) 600. Marais, Farlam and Brand JJA (concurring with Nienaber JA) stated 
that "… the days are long past when blinkered peering at an isolated provision in a 
statute was thought to be the only legitimate technique in interpreting it if it seemed 
on the face of it to have a readily discernible meaning". 
75  Section 65(6)(a) of the Competition Act. The fact that s 49D contemplates a damages 
award between parties which would extinguish a potential s 65(6) damages action 
should not be seen to lend support to the notion that such damages are to be 
considered statutory damages. When dealing with s 49D, damages included in a 
consent order agreed to among the infringing party, the Competition Commission 
and the injured party, it is important to note that neither the Competition Tribunal nor 
Competition Commission are required to assess a victim's damages or determine a 
damages quantum. These damages agreed to in terms of s 49D are equivalent to a 
settlement agreement between the parties. This therefore strengthens the regulatory 
nature of the Competition Act, with certain functions falling within the scope and 
jurisdiction of the Competition Commission, Competition Tribunal and Competition 
Appeal Court, and the assessment and quantification of damages in terms of s 65 
falling within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. 
76  Emphasis added. 
77  Prohibited Practice is defined in the Competition Act as a practice prohibited in terms 
of Chapter 2. 
78  Section 13A(3) of the Competition Act: "The parties to an intermediate or large 
merger may not implement that merger until it has been approved, with or without 
conditions, by the Competition Commission in terms of section 14(1)(b), the 
Competition Tribunal in terms of section 16 (2) or the Competition Appeal Court in 
terms of section 17." The Act further imposes a potential penalty against firms 
contravening the merger notification requirements prescribed by Chapter 3 of the 
Act; to this extent see s 59(1)(d) of the Act.  
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merger without the required notification and subsequent approval thereof by 
the competition authorities. Such a contravention of the Act could equally 
result in a party’s suffering damages and seeking recourse against the 
contravening parties before the civil courts. This would, however, fall outside 
the ambit of section 65(6) of the Act. 
The suggested interpretation is further supported when examples of 
statutes which expressly create statutory damages actions are considered. 
These statutes include the Aviation Act 74 of 1962, the National Nuclear 
Regulator Act 47 of 1999, and the Post Office Act 44 of 1958. These statutes 
allow for damages to be dealt with in a manner other than through the 
normal principles associated with damages actions before the civil courts. 
As illustration, the Aviation Act, section 11(2) reads:  
Where material damage or loss is caused by an aircraft in flight, taking off or 
landing, or by any person in such aircraft, or by any article falling from any 
such aircraft, to any person on land or water, damages may be recovered from 
the owner of the aircraft in respect of such damage or loss, without proof of 
negligence or intention or other cause of action as though such damage or 
loss had been caused by his wilful act, neglect or default. 
It is clear that the Aviation Act has expressly done away with the need for a 
claimant to prove the elements of a delictual action in order to claim 
damages in terms of the Act. 
The Competition Act, section 65(6), has not expressly sought to stipulate a 
different means of establishing and assessing damages other than the 
application of the normal principles of damages as applied by the civil 
courts. All section 65(6) has done is regulate which forum will be authorised 
to assess damages, and by implication, which of the elements are required 
to be alleged and proven in order to be successful with a civil damages 
action for follow-on damages arising from a breach of the Act. 
4.6 Conclusion: section 65 as a statutory or delictual action 
While no ruling was made, and despite recognising the plausibility of the 
argument advanced by Premier, the court remarked that section 65 of the 
Act appears not to contain the necessary elements for establishing an 
exclusive statutory remedy such as was contended by Premier.79 
Ostensibly, section 65 merely confirms the procedure and directs the forum 
for the follow-on damages claim and is not an independent action creating 
provision. The regulatory nature of section 65 supports the notion that the 
follow-on damages claim is a claim based on a delict. In the absence of an 
expressly-worded liability-creating provision and formula for the 
                                            
79  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) paras 67-68, 244. 
Wallis states: "I am not convinced that s 65 of the Act provides for the type of 
exclusive follow-on remedy for which Premier contends." 
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determination of damages in the particular statute, the common-law 
principles of assessment of damages applies.80 
The reluctance of the Supreme Court of Appeal to entertain the argument 
that section 65 sanctions a statutory damages action may stem from the 
fact that the court appeared open to the idea of allowing class actions to be 
pursued in the case of section 65 damages claims in order to properly 
vindicate the rights of prejudiced consumers.81 The liberal interpretation 
given by Wallis to the notion of a person who has suffered loss or damage 
being entitled to commence an action for delictual damages, in order to 
include class actions, seemingly puts an end to the argument that the extent 
of the potential damages action is narrowly and rigidly regulated by the 
provisions of the Act, seemingly favouring an interpretation that section 65 
damages actions before the civil courts ought to be commenced as delictual 
actions recognised at common-law. 
5 Nationwide Airlines v South African Airways: a critical 
view 
The Gauteng High Court was tasked with adjudicating the first section 65 
damages action in Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South 
African Airways.82 
While this was undoubtedly an opportunity for South Africa to gain clarity on 
certain of the vexing aspects relating to follow-on damages actions, the 
court failed to provide any significant foundation upon which these actions 
can grow and develop, instead taking a disappointingly easy way out. 
5.1 Delictual claim 
In the very first line Nicholls J expressed the position that section 65 follow-
on damages actions are to be classified as delictual actions.83 
                                            
80  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) paras 69, 245. 
See also Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Delict 399-402; and Potgieter, 
Steynberg and Floyd Visser and Potgieter Law of Damages 452. 
81  Children's Resource Centre v Pioneer Food 2013 2 SA 213 (SCA) para 21. Wallis 
JA stated: "… in my judgment it would be irrational for the court to sanction a class 
action in cases where a constitutional right is invoked, but to deny it in equally 
appropriate circumstances, merely because of the claimants' inability to point to the 
infringement of a right protected under the Bill of Rights. The procedural 
requirements that will be determined in relation to the one type of case can equally 
easily be applied in the other. Class actions are a particularly appropriate way in 
which to vindicate some types of constitutional rights, but they are equally useful in 
the context of mass personal injury cases or consumer litigation". 
82  Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2016 
6 SA 19 (GJ). 
83  Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2016 
6 SA 19 (GJ) 22. Nicholls J stated: "… this is a delictual claim, the first of its kind …". 
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While the position adopted by Nicholls J in the classification of the nature of 
the follow-on damages claim is supported by the author, disappointingly 
Nicholls J provided no explanation as to the reasons for finding that this was 
a delictual claim. The failure to do so is particularly disappointing given the 
debate that had taken place in the Supreme Court of Appeal regarding the 
nature of the section 65 claim. 
This tar-brush approach to the nature of the claim is further carried over to 
the assessment of causation, which is a fundamental aspect of any 
damages assessment. In dealing with causation, Nicholls J simply relied on 
the finding of the Competition Tribunal (confirmed by the Competition 
Appeal Court) that the conduct of South African Airways was the major 
cause of the decrease in volume of Nationwide's passengers and 
consequently Nationwide's loss. Nicholls J then stated "Those are findings 
which cannot be faulted but, in any event, to which this court is bound."84 
A civil court is bound by the findings of the competition authorities as set out 
in the section 65 certificate issued prior to the commencement of the civil 
damages action. The section 65(6)(b) certificate must be in the prescribed 
form:85 
(i) certifying that the conduct constituting the basis of the action has been 
found to be a prohibited practice in terms of this Act;  
(ii) stating the date of the Tribunal or Competition Appeal Court finding; 
and  
(iii) setting out the section of this Act in terms of which the Tribunal or the 
Competition Appeal Court made its finding.  
The s65 certificate makes no reference to the merits of the civil claim and 
no binding finding on the civil court insofar as the assessment of the element 
of causation is concerned.  
While civil courts may be well within their rights to consider the merits of the 
competition complaint referral and possibly assess the expert reports and 
evidence presented during the complaint referral proceedings, it is 
ultimately for the civil court to apply its mind in a fair and efficient manner in 
assessing the remaining elements of the delictual action, being causation 
and damages. The blank reliance on the finding of the Tribunal insofar as 
the causation element is concerned is submitted to be incorrect and fails to 
make use of the opportunity to guide civil courts on dealing with the 
assessment of damages actions brought in terms of section 65 of the Act. 
                                            
84  Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2016 
6 SA 19 (GJ) 32. 
85  Emphasis added. 
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6 Conclusion 
A strong presumption exists that the legislature does not intend to alter the 
common-law, save where such an intention appears expressly from the 
applicable legislation.86 If the legislature intends for the statute to vary the 
operation of the common law by introducing strict liability, then the statute 
must make express reference to the remedies sought to be introduced and 
implemented for the purposes of the statute.87 
For this reason, it is concluded that the nature of the damages action arising 
in terms of section 65 of the Act is that of a delictual action, as stated by 
Nicholls J in Nationwide Airlines,88 and not a statutory action, as proposed 
by Premier. A delictual action (unshackled by a restrictive statutory 
interpretation) gives proper effect to the legislative objective to promote a 
dualistic enforcement regime, whereby the interests of society at large and 
individual parties who have suffered private damages at the hands of a 
prohibited practice are adequately protected and advanced. 
It can be argued that a statutory damages action based on strict liability 
would facilitate a more accessible system of follow-on damages, because 
claimants will be freed from the burden of having to allege and prove the 
elements to succeed with a delictual action.89 It must nonetheless be borne 
in mind that the Competition Tribunal (or Competition Appeal Court) would 
have made a finding on certain elements required for the purposes of a 
delictual action, and a claimant's evidentiary burden is already significantly 
eased. The delictual elements of conduct and the unlawfulness of the 
conduct would have been considered and determined by the Competition 
Tribunal (or Competition Appeal Court). The claimant will be required to 
show only that it is entitled to claim damages arising from the breach of 
statute,90 together with the remaining delictual elements of damage (and the 
extent of the damages) and causation. 
It is submitted that precisely because of the complex nature of damages 
determination and the fact that not all breaches necessarily cause damages 
to individuals or the public, the legislator opted for the dual approach rather 
                                            
86  Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2002 SA 49 SA (SCA) para 16. Also see Steyn 
Uitleg van Wette 97, 153. 
87  See s 47 of the Compensation of Occupational Diseases Injuries Act 130 of 1993. 
88  Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 2016 
6 SA 19 (GJ). 
89  Scallan, Mbikiwa and Blignaut 2013 http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Conference-Paper-Final-21-08-2013.pdf 10. 
90  The requirements are: (i) contravened statute was intended to give rise to a cause 
of action; (ii) claimant is a party for whose benefit the statutory duty exists; (iii) 
damage sustained was of the type contemplated by the legislature in the statute; (iv) 
provisions of the statute were in fact infringed; and (v) the claimant suffered damage 
as a result of the statutory infringement. 
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than attempting to enact an action-creating and damages-quantifying 
formula. This conclusion is supported by the wording of section 65, read in 
conjunction with section 49D(4). These sections are the only sections in the 
Act which deal with damages. Their wording confirms a prejudiced party's 
entitlement to damages, and makes it clear that damages are excluded only 
where they have been awarded as part of a consent order in pursuance of 
a settlement. In conclusion, the Competition Act of 1998 does not define 
damages. This being the case, it follows that when the legislator uses the 
concept of “damages” in the Act, this can be a reference to common law 
damages only. 
Proving the elements of conduct, wrongfulness and fault could never be a 
serious stumbling block for follow-on damages arising from a breach of the 
Act, because this is covered by a finding of a contravention by the 
Competition Tribunal or Competition Appeal Court.91 
Once the claimant has established that the provision of the statute allowing 
a damages action was enacted for the benefit of the claimant, together with 
the fact that the type of damage suffered by the claimant was the type of 
damage contemplated by the legislature when enacting the statutory 
provision, then this will form the basis for establishing the wrongfulness of 
the conduct and the right to pursue the damages action. 
The Competition Act contemplates a broad range of claimants, allowing any 
person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of a contravention of 
the Act to bring an action for damages, essentially identifying a group of 
persons who could be considered the beneficiaries of the statutory 
provision.92 
With the element of fault and wrongfulness being (for all practical purposes) 
essentially moot, the primary burden on a claimant seeking to enforce the 
right to claim damages, as provided for in section 65 of the Act, is to quantify 
                                            
91  The positive conduct and subsequent intentional nature of the infringements referred 
to in the Competition Act are clear from the wording describing the prohibited 
conduct. These examples include: s 4(1) An agreement between firms…; s 4(1)(b)(i) 
directly or indirectly fixing a purchase price or selling price or any trading condition; 
s 4(1)(b)(ii) dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific 
types of goods or services; s 4(1)(b)(iii) collusive tendering; s 8(a) charging an 
excessive price; s 8(b) refusing to give a competitor access to an essential facility. 
The Competition Act makes no reference to negligent or accidental contraventions 
of the Act and all the examples of prohibited conduct refer to positive actions taken 
by competitors (in the case of s 4 contraventions) and dominant firms (in the case of 
s 8 or s 9 contraventions). It is clear that the conduct described and prohibited by the 
Act is positive conduct and can subsequently be considered intentional conduct. 
92  Section 65(6)(a) of the Competition Act. 
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the extent of the damage suffered as a result of the contravention of the Act 
and to prove that the defendants conduct caused the damage suffered.93 
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